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JOHN LILBURNE AND THE
LONG PARLIAMENT*
J. T. PEACEY
History of Parliament, London
abstract. This piece reinterprets the career of the Leveller, John Lilburne, during the English
Civil War, by re-examining the oﬃcial sources pertaining to him, and the multitude of pamphlets
writtenbyhimselfandhisenemies.ThearticlerecoversthechronologyofLilburne'sstory,bystripping
away the layers of propaganda with which he later surrounded himself. It shows that he had powerful
friendsatWestminster,andthathistribulationswerecausedbypoliticalrivalrieswithinWestminster
rather than his development of a radical political theory. He is shown to have formed part of the
`Independentalliance'duringthemid-s,althoughhisprotectedpositionwaseventuallyimperilled
by the fracturing of this group after the end of the ®rst Civil War. The aim is to improve not just our
understanding of Lilburne, but the complexity of parliamentarian politics during the s.
A man of restless, boyling and unwearied spirit, condemned by his ungovernable
temper to perpetual troubles, and quarrels with his superiors, and always opposing
himself to the power that was uppermost."
Scholarship concerning John Lilburne has arguably progressed little since
JohnNalsonpennedtheabovewordsin1682,andfewwouldnowdisagreethat
Lilburne was both `ungovernable' and in `perpetual' dispute with the powers
underwhichhelived.Indeed,onerecentscholarascribedtohim`apsychology
of confrontation and protest'.# It is true that Lilburne was one of the `puritan
martyrs' of the 1630s; tutored in illicit printing by Burton, Bastwick, and
Prynne, and tortured like them on the pillory.$ It is also true that, as a godly
hero, Lilburne received favourable treatment from the Long Parliament,
where his release was eﬀected through the eﬀorts of Oliver Cromwell.%
Furthermore, it is undeniable that by the late 1640s Lilburne had been
transformedfromherointopublicenemy,astheleaderoftheLevellers,andthe
* I am grateful to members of the seventeenth-century British history seminar at the Institute
of Historical Research, and to Prof. John Morrill, Dr David Scott, and Dr Ian Roy for comments
on an earlier draft of this article.
" J. Nalson, An impartial collection (2 vols., 1682±3), i,p .512. All pre-1800 works were published
in London unless otherwise stated. The standard biographical account of Lilburne, on which I
have drawn heavily, is P. Gregg, Free-born John (London, 1986).
# M. Tolmie, The triumph of the saints (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 146±7.
$ J. Lilburne, The Christian man's triall (1641); PRO, PC 2}49, fos. 55v±6v; J. Rushworth,
Historical collections (8 vols., 1721), ii, pp. 463±9.
% Commons Journals (CJ), ii,p .24; The journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, ed. W. Notestein (New
Haven, 1923), pp. 18±19.
625626 j. t. peacey
powerful and proli®c spokesman for religious toleration and political rad-
icalism. He then became a target for a parliament with whose policies he was
disillusioned, and during the republic a sophisticated campaign of literary
warfare was waged against him.& However, this article seeks to reinterpret the
period during which Lilburne became the villain; the period before the birth
of the Levellers. It certainly appears that during this period too Lilburne was
`ungovernable', since he was in and out of prison with alarming regularity.
However, there is a danger of succumbing to a retrospective historical analysis
and of being hoodwinked by Lilburne's self-publicity. Some scholars mis-
interpret Lilburne because they treat parliament as a united whole in the mid-
1640s, rather than a body split into rival groups. Thus, when Lilburne is seen
to have been imprisoned as a result of a decision at Westminster, he is assumed
tohavefallen outwith `parliament'.'Otherserr becauseofanapproach which
seeks to look for the origins of the Levellers, and thus tends to emphasize only
certain elements of his career.( It is entirely legitimate to study Lilburne's
radical ideas, and the early phase of the Levellers, since these are undoubtedly
important elements of his career. There is, however, a danger of mis-
representing Lilburne if other aspects of his life remain ignored. My aim is not
so much to reinterpret Lilburne completely, but to demonstrate a hitherto
neglected aspect of his story, and one which suggests him to have been a more
complex character than some have been prepared to admit.
I intend to strip away the comments made after Lilburne became a Leveller,
and to rescue the narrative of Lilburne's troubles in the mid-1640s.) In doing
so I shall reassess Lilburne's career by locating him within the factional
landscape in the 1640s; exploring the ways in which he was both helped and
hindered, and by whom. The aim will be to show that Lilburne was neither
`ungovernable' nor perpetually in struggle with his superiors. Lilburne's
persecution was not the work of a united parliament, but of the Presbyterians,
one of the competing groups at Westminster, who attacked him because of his
association with the political Independents. Furthermore, it will be shown that
Lilburneformed an integral part of the `Independent alliance', and that it was
this group which protected him. Having established when, why, and by whom
Lilburne was befriended, it will then be possible to understand when and why
Lilburne and his friends came to blows. The result will be an interpretation
which, while not necessarily downplaying the importance of Lilburne as a
radical political thinker, seeks to stress that such radicalism did not auto-
matically impact on his political associations. While Lilburne clearly became
more radical during the 1640s, the crucial development in his political theory
will be found not to correlate with the developments in his career. That this is
& J. T. Peacey, `Henry Parker and parliamentary propaganda in the English Civil Wars'
(Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1994), pp. 217±24. ' Gregg, Free-born John, pp. 121, 126±7.
( J. Frank, The Levellers (New York, 1969), pp. 45±108; F. D. Dow, Radicalism in the English
Revolution, ± (Oxford, 1985), p. 35.
) J. Lilburne, The legal fundamental liberties (2nd edn, 1649).lilburne and the long parliament 627
the case has to do with the nature of the political alliance of which Lilburne
formed a part, and detailed scrutiny of Lilburne's career in the mid-1640s
suggests that it was his relationship with the complex and shifting factions and
theirpersonalitieswhichiscrucialforanunderstandingofthevicissitudesofhis
career.
I
Until the spring of 1645 Lilburne was a faithful servant of parliament. During
1641, while parliament considered his treatment during the `personal rule',
Lilburne was active in mobilizing mass demonstrations,* and upon the
outbreak of war established a military reputation under Lord Brooke."! When
Lilburne was captured by royalists and threatened with execution, parliament
threatened retaliation,"" ensuring that Lilburne was reprieved and made the
bene®ciaryofahigh-levelprisonerexchange."#Highlyregardedbyparliament,
he was recruited into military service in the regiment of Colonel Edward King,
rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel under the earl of Manchester."$
Conventional wisdom, however, suggests that Lilburne broke with parliament
in early 1645. One scholar has claimed that this period marked `a genuine
turning point in the history of the revolution', that it was the point at which
`the iron appears to have entered Lilburne's soul', and that it marked `the
genesis of the Leveller party as a self conscious entity'."% Although recent
scholarship has begun to undermine the idea of tracing the emergence of the
Levellers back to 1645,"& too many scholars have emphasized Lilburne's
con¯icts with parliament, and his contacts with radicals, while ignoring the
elements of co-operation."' He certainly began to frequent London's prisons,
and made the crucial conceptual developments in his political thought, by
suggestingthat parliament was susceptible to criticisms formerly levelled at the
* British Library (BL), Harleian MS 163, fos. 128, 197; CJ, ii,p .134; B. Manning, The English
people and the English Revolution (London, 1991), pp. 63±4; K. Lindley, Popular politics and religion in
Civil War London (Aldershot, 1997), pp. 22, 31, 110; Lords Journals (LJ), iv,p .233.
"! PRO, SP 28}3, fo. 219.
"" Englands weeping spectacle (1648), pp. 4±5; CJ, ii,p .892; Rushworth, Collections, v,p .93;
J. Lilburne, A letter sent from Captain Lilburne (1643);LJ, ii,p .497; House of Lords Records Oﬃce
(HLRO), MP 17}12}42; Speciall Passages, 18 (6±13 Dec. 1642); The examination and confession of
Captaine Lilbourne (1642), A true and most sad relation of the hard usage and extrem cruelty (1642).
"# CJ, iii,p .84. "$ The Kingdomes Weekly Post 4 (22±8 Nov. 1643), p. 30.
"% J. R. MacCormack, Revolutionary politics in the Long Parliament (Cambridge, MA, 1973),
pp. 90±1.
"& P. R. S. Baker, `The origins and early history of the Levellers, c.1636±c.1647' (Ph.D. thesis,
Cambridge, forthcoming). I am exceedingly grateful to Phil Baker for making some of his research
available to me.
"' M. A. Gibb, John Lilburne the Leveller (London, 1947), pp. 124±9; T. C. Pease, The Leveller
movement (Gloucester, MA, 1965), pp. 95±119; Tolmie, Triumph of the saints, pp. 49, 144±9;
M.Kishlansky,TheriseoftheNewModelArmy(Cambridge,1979),pp.89,122,133;H. N.Brailsford,
The Levellers and the English Revolution (London, 1976), pp. 90±5; The writings of William Walwyn, ed.
J. R. McMichael and B. Taft (London, 1989), pp. 21±6; Gregg, Free-born John, pp. 121±3, 127;
G. E. Aylmer, The Levellers in the English Revolution (New York, 1975), pp. 16±17.628 j. t. peacey
king, and that parliamentarian theory could justify resistance to parliament."(
Itisclearlytempting, therefore,toassumethat Lilburne'stroubleswere caused
by his emergent radicalism. It would be wrong to make such a connection,
however, since to do so would ¯y in the face of the detailed evidence regarding
Lilburne's `troubles', and fall into the trap of reading back into the mid-1640s
commentswhichbothLilburneandhisenemiesmadesubsequently.Lilburne's
numerous comments upon his trials and tribulations are as problematic as they
are valuable, and must be supplemented with evidence from other sources,
both oﬃcial and unoﬃcial.
Lilburne began to face problems in 1645, but Gerald Aylmer is correct to
suggest that this period marked only `the beginning of Lilburne's breach with
the Long Parliament'.") His tribulations began because he had aligned himself
with the `Independents', both political and religious, rather than because he
had developed a radical ideology. His problems were caused by Presbyterians,
and not by parliament as a whole. Lilburne's diﬃculties stemmed from his
relationship with Colonel King, whose aggressive Presbyterianism made him a
controversial ®gure. In the aftermath of Marston Moor, the controversy
surrounding King became more serious, and Lilburne teamed up with the
county committee in Lincolnshire in the hope of getting King court-
martialled."* In November 1644, furthermore, Lilburne was one of Cromwell's
allies in the dispute with the earl of Manchester, and was thus involved in
creating the impetus to `new model' the army.#! Furthermore, Lilburne began
to develop his attack upon Presbyterianism. One prominent Presbyterian,
John Bastwick, claimed that Lilburne's religious radicalism developed during
the 1630s, but such comments must be treated sceptically, since they were not
made until late1645, afterhe had joined the campaignagainst Lilburne. What
Bastwick omitted to say was that the two men had remained friends, and that
Lilburne had greeted him on his release from a royalist prison in October
1644.#" It was only at the end of 1644 that Lilburne became a warrior for the
Independent cause, after becoming disillusioned with two of Manchester's
Presbyterian divines, Simeon Ashe and William Goode.## Lilburne began to
develop his attack upon Presbyterianism in early 1645, alongside contro-
versialists such as John Goodwin, and with the assistance of Marchamont
Nedham, the leading parliamentarian journalist, who was well connected to
the Independent grandees.#$
"( A. Sharp, `John Lilburne and the Long Parliament's Book of declarations: a radical's
exploitation of the words of authorities', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), pp. 19±44.
") Aylmer, The Levellers,p .18.
"* C. Holmes, `Colonel King and Lincolnshire politics, 1642±1646', Historical Journal, 16
(1973), 455±71; J. Lilburne, The just man's justi®cation (2nd edn, 1647), pp. 2±3, 22±4.
#! Calendarofstatepapersdomestic(CSPD)±,pp.148±9;J.Lilburne,Innocencyandtruth(1645),
p. 22; J. Lilburne, The prisoners mournfull cry (1648), p. 8.
#" J. Bastwick, A just defence (1645), pp. 14±15; M. J. Condick, `The life and works of John
Bastwick, 1595±1654' (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1983), pp. 91±4, 147±8, 155±6.
## J. Lilburne, The grand plea of Lieut. Col. John Lilburne (1647), pp. 2±3; Lilburne, Innocency and
truth,p .24.
#$ J. Lilburne, An answer to nine arguments (1645); Peacey, `Henry Parker', p. 158.lilburne and the long parliament 629
Lilburne's alliance with Cromwell certainly made him enemies, but his
attack upon Presbyterianism and Colonel King, and his association with
Marchamont Nedham, aroused the ire of two men in particular, William
PrynneandJohnBastwick.Itwasthisclash ± parttheology,partideology,and
part personality ± which provides the key to understanding Lilburne's career
in the mid-1640s. Prynne, the dogged champion of religious Presbyterianism,
engaged in interminable pamphlet controversies over church government, and
to some extent Lilburne was simply a participant in this debate.#% Having
joined the Independent alliance, however, Lilburne oﬀended Prynne further
by attacking his close friend, Colonel King,#& and by working with his bitter
enemy, Marchamont Nedham.#' These ingredients combined to produce a
potent brew in January 1645. When Lilburne replied to a work by Prynne
called Truth triumphing ± with an open letter in which he complained of
Presbyterian constraints on liberty of conscience and freedom of the press ± he
found himself in trouble with parliament's committee of examinations.#( The
seriousinjurywhichLilburnesubsequentlyreceivedcausedtheplannedtrialto
be suspended, but did not prevent him from travelling to Lincolnshire and
resuming his attack upon Colonel King. Upon his return to London in May,
however, Lilburne was called before the committee of examinations
(16 May),#) and when he published the answer to his interrogators (17 May)
was ordered to be arrested (18 June).#* The danger inherent in relying upon
Lilburne's account of this episode is overcome by the fact that Prynne
concurred in apportioning responsibility for these events. Both men recorded
the confrontation which occurred between Lilburne and Prynne in West-
minster Hall, and both agreed that it was Prynne who ensured that the matter
was brought to the attention of the committee of examinations. Furthermore,
both accounts con®rm that Prynne was present at the hearing,$! where
Lilburne claimed to have been `tossed and tumbled' by his adversary, `so as if
he would have beat me to dust and powder'.$" It seems clear, therefore, that it
was Prynne who persecuted Lilburne in June 1645, and that his animus was
#% J. Goodwin, Innocency and truth triumphing (1645); John Vicars to John Goodwin (1645);
J.Goodwin,Calumnyarraignedandcast(1645);J.Vicars,TohisreverendandmuchrespectedgoodfriendMr
JohnGoodwin(1645);W.Walwyn,Ahelpetotherightunderstanding(1645);W.Prynne,Afreshdiscovery
of some prodigious new wandring-blasing-stars (1645), pp. 3, 34, 38; J. Vicars, The picture of Independency
(1645), pp. 8±9; M. N[edham], Independencie no schisme (1646).
#& LJ, vi, pp. 573±6; Holmes, `Colonel King', pp. 460, 473; J. T. Peacey, `Politics, accounts,
and propaganda in the Long Parliament', in Chris R. Kyle and J. T. Peacey, eds., Parliament at
work, ± (forthcoming). #' Peacey, `Henry Parker', pp. 154±5, 179±80.
#( J. Lilburne, A copie of a letter ¼ to Mr William Prinne (1645);Perfect Diurnall, 77 (13±20 Jan.
1645), p. 612; W. Prynne, The lyar confounded (1645), pp. 3±4; LJ, vii,p .142; Historical
Manuscripts Commission (HMC), Sixth report (Nendeln, 1979), p. 46; H. R. Plomer, `Secret
printing during the Civil War', The Library, n.s., 5 (1904), pp. 374±403.
#) Prynne, Lyar, pp. 4±5; Lilburne, Innocency and truth,p .9.
#* Prynne, Lyar,p .6; J. Lilburne, The reasons of Lieu. Col. Lilbournes sending his letter (1645);
Lilburne, Innocency and truth,p .10.
$! Prynne, Lyar, pp. 4±5; Lilburne, Innocency and truth, pp. 9±10; Prynne, Fresh discovery,p .34.
$" J. Lilburne, The resolved mans resolution (1647), p. 30.630 j. t. peacey
based upon personal and religious diﬀerences, as well as his desire to protect
Colonel King.
There was a wider context to this battle between Lilburne and Prynne,
however, which involved the bigger picture of Westminster politics. Prynne
probably sought to serve the interests of his friends among the parliamentary
Presbyterians, to whom Lilburne posed a growing threat. In April 1645,
Lilburne had informed Cromwell and Sir Henry Vane about the behaviour of
DenzilHolles,one oftheir Presbyterianpoliticalrivals,whohad allegedlybeen
involved in negotiations with royalists in 1643. Prynne probably sought, in
other words, to prevent Lilburne giving evidence during the `Savile aﬀair', a
complex political scandal during June and July, in which the Independents
made such reports public. Once Lord Savile had made his accusations
regarding the treachery of the leading Presbyterians, the matter was subject to
detailed scrutiny, and those, like Lilburne, with a story to tell, were likely to be
given the chance to make their own evidence public.$# It is this wider context
which goes some way to explaining why Lilburne was being protected by
elementswithin Westminster who wanted to discredit Holles, and who ensured
that Lilburne was released in June 1645 without charge. The contribution
which Lilburne was able to make to the Savile aﬀair, therefore, may explain
both the Presbyterian attempt to silence him and the Independent desire to
protect him. Lilburne's release clearly annoyed Prynne, who accused the
committee of examinations of being too `indulgent' towards him, and the
political sympathies of the committee's chairman, Miles Corbet, certainly lay
with the Independent alliance.$$ In later years, Lilburne claimed that `black
Corbet' had worked against him, but it seems likely that, on the contrary, he
worked to achieve the opposite outcome.$%
That this wider context of parliamentarian factionalism is crucial to
Lilburne's story becomes clear from events in July 1645. Within weeks of his
release, Lilburne again provided grounds for his opponents to order his arrest,
having been overheard in the Court of Requests making allegations regarding
the speaker, William Lenthall, and the prominent Presbyterian grandee, Sir
Robert Harley (19 July).$& Lilburne later blamed Lenthall for his arrest, but
the contemporary evidence suggests that it was the Presbyterian friends of
William Prynne who masterminded the prosecution.$' It was certainly a
Presbyterian newspaper which claimed that Lilburne was arrested `for
reporting some false and scandalous words concerning a worthy member of the
$# HLRO, MP 30}6}45, fos. 260, 262v±3; MacCormack, Revolutionary politics,p .86; BL, Add.
MS 18780, fo. 79b; M. Mahony, `The Savile aﬀair and the politics of the Long Parliament',
ParliamentaryHistory,7(1988), pp.212±27;P. Crawford,DenzilHolles(London,1979),pp.99±122;
V.Pearl,`LondonpuritansandScotch®fthcolumnists:amid-seventeenth-centuryphenomenon',
in A. Hollaender and W. Kellaway, eds., Studies in London history (London, 1969), pp. 317±31.
$$ Prynne, Lyar,p .6; W. Epstein, `The committee for examinations and parliamentary justice,
1642±1647', Journal of Legal History, 7 (1986), pp. 3±22.
$% Lilburne, Legal fundamental liberties (2nd edn), p. 28. $& CJ, iv,p .213.
$' Lilburne, Legal fundamental liberties (2nd edn), p. 28.lilburne and the long parliament 631
honourableHouseofCommons,whoseintegrityand®delityiswellknown,and
upon whom no blemish could as yet fasten'.$( Furthermore, Lilburne's loose
words were reported to the Commons by Colonel King and John Bastwick,
whohadrecentlyventuredintoprintasanallyofthePresbyterians.Itwasthey
who ensured that Lilburne was taken into custody and held until his
appearance before the committee of examinations on 24 July.$) They were not
simply satisfying their own malice, however, but serving the interests of the
Presbyterian faction. This is clear from the fact that Lilburne was arrested on
the day following the Commons's summons for him to give evidence in the
Savile aﬀair.$* Lilburne was probably arrested, in other words, for things that
he might have been about to say, rather than for what he had said already.
Lilburne, however, was already addicted to producing self-justi®catory
pamphlets, and promptly published his version of the events surrounding his
arrest,doubtlesstothedelightofhisenemies.Lilburne'segocentricandreckless
behaviour made further action inevitable, and a report by John Glyn
(9 August), paved the way for Lilburne's committal to Newgate, pending a
new trial.%! That the prosecution was to be marshalled by Glyn suggests the
in¯uence of the Presbyterians once again, and Lilburne certainly considered
him to be his `professed enemy'.%" Indeed, Lilburne detected a Presbyterian
conspiracy against him, and while in custody in August 1645 he alleged that
Bastwick, Prynne, and King had been set to work `to make an uproar in the
city', where Lilburne's friends were framing an important petition (presented
on 26 August). Scared of his in¯uence, Lilburne alleged, these men proceeded
by `framing, posting, and dispersing scandalous paper libels ¼ to make me
odious and destroy me'.%# Lilburne had good grounds for suspecting a plot,
since the eﬀorts of this cabal resulted in a pamphlet which clearly sought to
attack him.%$
Lilburne had, it seems, become a pawn in the political struggles within
Westminster, and once more a change in his fortunes was eﬀected only by
friends among the political Independents. On 13 August, new men were
enlisted to be involved in the trial, in a fairly transparent attempt to protect
him. John Bradshaw, the future president of the Rump's council of state, was
ordered to take the examination of Lilburne, and `to manage such proofs as
shall appear'.%% Bradshaw's assistant on this occasion was a Lincoln's Inn
$( Mercurius Civicus, 113 (17±24 July 1645), p. 1001.
$) Prynne, Lyar, pp. 6±7; J. Lilburne, The copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonell John Lilburne to a
friend (1645), pp. 1, 8, 9, 12; Lilburne, Innocency and truth, pp. 10, 13; J. Lilburne, England's miserie
andremedie(1645),p.3;Lilburne,Grandplea,p.3;Condick,`JohnBastwick',pp.156±61;Bastwick,
Just defence, pp. 7±8; Lilburne, Just mans justi®cation (2nd edn), p. 3; CJ, iv,p .215.
$* CJ, iv,p .212; BL, Add. MS 18780, fo. 79b.
%! Lilburne, Copy of a letter ¼ to a friend; CJ, iv, pp. 235, 236±7; BL, Add. MS 18780, fo. 93a;
BL, Add. MS 31116,p .450; Lilburne, Innocency and truth, pp. 15, 17.
%" Lilburne,Justmansjusti®cation(2ndedn),p.25;Prynne,Lyar,pp.7±8;D.Underdown,Pride's
purge (Oxford, 1971), pp. 69, 81.
%# J. Lilburne, England's birthright justi®ed (1645), p. 26; Lilburne, Innocency and truth, pp. 28±9.
%$ Bastwick, Just defence, pp. 4, 8. %% CJ, iv,p .239; BL, Add. MS 18780, fo. 95b.632 j. t. peacey
lawyer named Gabriel Becke, who was a client of Viscount Saye, and widely
regarded as his political puppet.%& Lilburne would later allege that Bradshaw's
appointmentrepresented an attemptto convict, rather thanassist, him, but his
retrospective interpretation con¯icts with the action of those most anxious to
secure a successful prosecution.%' The Presbyterians, probably alarmed by the
appointment of Bradshaw and Becke, and suspicious that they would obstruct
a successful prosecution, ensured that they were quickly discharged
(26 August). They were replaced by two less controversial ®gures, Walter
Walker and William Steele, who were probably regarded as being more
reliable, or more pliable.%( Nevertheless, such political manoeuvring failed to
ensure that the prosecution's case was produced at the quarter sessions (8±
9 October), and after issuing both an appeal to the lord mayor, and more self-
justi®catory pamphlets, Lilburne was released (14 October).%) In response to
whattheyprobablyregardedasashambolicanddisappointingaﬀair,however,
the Presbyterians were determined to salvage some political advantage. First,
a warrant was issued to search for copies of one of Lilburne's books, England's
birthright, which was derided as `a scurrilous and scandalous libel'.%* More
importantly, revenge was exacted with the appearance of Prynne's stinging
attack upon Lilburne in The lyar confounded, which appeared on the very day
that he was set free.&! The appearance of this work reinforced Lilburne's
opinion that Prynne had had `more than a ®nger' in his initial arrest, and he
commented that when Prynne saw `that I was likely honourably to be
deliveredasaspotlessandinnocentman,heframesabook,andpublishesitcum
privilegio'.&"
During 1645, therefore, Lilburne was targeted by the Presbyterians, who
attacked him not just on account of his alignment against Prynne, Colonel
King, and the earl of Manchester, but because of the threat he posed to Holles
and the Presbyterian grandees. They did not attack him, however, on the basis
of his political theory, which was largely ignored at this stage. More complex
is Lilburne's relationship with the Independents, who were clearly protecting
him.Lilburne'sradicalismdidnotstandinthewayofhisclosealliancewiththe
Independents because of the very nature of the `Independent alliance' at this
point. In the early months of the Civil War, parliamentarians have generally
been described as having formed three loose groups: the `war', `peace', and
`middle' groups.&# During late 1644 and 1645, however, a realignment took
%& CJ, iii,p .653; CJ, iv, pp. 155, 169; HMC, Sixth report,p .63; J. T. Peacey, `Led by the hand:
manucaptors and patronage at Lincoln's Inn in the seventeenth century', Journal of Legal History,
18 (1997), pp. 26±44. %' Lilburne, Legal fundamental liberties (2nd edn), p. 28.
%( CJ, iv,p .253; Lilburne, Innocency and truth,p .30.
%) Lilburne,Innocencyandtruth,pp.30,33,34,38;J.Lilburne,England's lamentableslaverie (1645);
Lilburne, Englands birthright justi®ed; CJ, iv,p .307.
%* The True Informer, 27 (25 Oct. 1645), p. 211.
&! CJ, iv,p .307; Prynne, Lyar, sig. A3. &" Lilburne, Resolved man's resolution,p .30.
&# J. H. Hexter, The reign of King Pym (Cambridge, MA, 1961); V. Pearl, `Oliver St John and
the middle group in the Long Parliament', English Historical Review, 81 (1966), pp. 490±519;
Underdown, Pride's purge, pp. 45±65.lilburne and the long parliament 633
place, during which the `middle' group and the `war' party joined forces to
form the `Independent alliance'. While members of this group diﬀered over
ultimate aims, they worked together in the interests of the war eﬀort, in order
to be able to secure a settlement from a position of strength.&$ They, like the
Presbyterians, were by no means suﬃciently organized to be called a political
`party'. Nevertheless, the working coherence of both groups, and the extent of
the divisions between them, was signi®cant, and has been underestimated by
some historians.&%
It was this Independent alliance which protected Lilburne, even if diﬀerent
elements valued him for diﬀerent reasons. The `Royal Independents' ± the
members of Hexter's `middle group' ± did not share Lilburne's radical ideas,
but were prepared to exploit him as a weapon against the Presbyterians,
particularlyduringthe Savileaﬀair.&& Furthermore,they probablyvalued him
as a man with in¯uence amongst the sectarian churches in London, and if
Nalson was correct in suspecting that political grandees were prepared to
sanction the use of mass demonstrations as a political tool, then Lilburne may
have been indispensable.&' An indication of Lilburne's cosy relationship with
the `Royal Independents' in 1645 lies in his comments regarding the grandees
at Westminster. In later years Lilburne would be scathing about the
Independents, but in 1645 he oﬀered little but praise. In the wake of his spell
in prison in the autumn of 1645, Lilburne certainly showed signs of doubting
Sir Henry Vane, Oliver St John, and Oliver Cromwell, but his letter to
Cromwell of December 1645 was full of warmth, and replete with expressions
of friendship.&(
While the `Royal Independents' were prepared to tolerate Lilburne, other
members of the Independent alliance shared his ideas, particularly proto-
republicanssuchasHenryMarten.&)Thisisclearfromoneparticularpamphlet
which appeared in the wake of both Lilburne's release and Prynne's attack in
the autumn of 1645. This was the Tractatus by a Lincoln's Inn lawyer called
William Ball,&* a friend of Henry Marten who was attempting to secure a
parliamentary seat with his help.'! In many ways Ball's pamphlet outlined a
conventional contractualist parliamentarian theory, but the novelty lay in his
&$ Underdown, Pride's purge, pp. 71±2. &% Kishlansky, New Model Army, pp. 212±27.
&& V. Pearl, `The `Royal Independents' in the English Civil War', Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, 5th ser., 18 (1968), pp. 69±96.
&' Nalson, Impartial collection, i,p .570. I am grateful to Phil Baker for a discussion on this point.
&( Lilburne, England's birthright justi®ed, pp. 30, 33; J. Lilburne, Jonahs cry (1647), pp. 12±13.
&) C. M. Williams, `The anatomy of a radical gentleman: Henry Marten', in D. Pennington
and K. Thomas, eds., Puritans and revolutionaries (Oxford, 1978), pp. 118±38.
&* W. Ball, Tractatus de jure regnandi (1645).
'! The four visitations of Berkshire, ed. W. H. Rylands (2 vols., London, 1908), ii,p .62; Reading
records, ed. J. M. Guilding (4 vols., London, 1896), iv, pp. 167±8, 170±5; CJ, iv,p .346; Berkshire
RecordOﬃce, TF 41 (Abingdoncorporation minute book1591±1686), fos.169r±v; CJ,iv,p.397.
This material stems from research into Ball's career which I have undertaken for the History of
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refusal to admit that parliament's power was `unlimited or boundless'. The
English constitution was a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy,
but one in which democracy prevailed, and in which rights existed against
parliament as well as the king. If parliament, the people's representative body,
could raise arms for the defence of the kingdom, so too could the people. They
were the `essential' body of the kingdom, and did not `disinvest themselves of
their right natural' by `reposing or granting such trust' in parliament.'" The
Lilburnian traces in this position are clear, and reveal that, far from alienating
friends with his radicalism, Lilburne found himself in agreement with powerful
voices at Westminster. Just as Lilburne had been protected from the
Presbyterians in 1645, so theorists such as Ball may have been spurred towards
publication by the need to bolster Lilburne in his hour of need. Indeed, the
appearance of Ball's tract was the ®rst evidence of a more coherent and subtle
campaign in support of Lilburne, whereby a public relations exercise was
undertaken to raise his pro®le, and to defend him against the Presbyterians.
II
Having established the narrative of Lilburne's career during 1645, and the
nature of his relationship with the political scene at Westminster, it is now
necessarytoassesshowsuchrelationshipsfaredintheensuingmonths,andhow
the changing balance of power between competing groups aﬀected Lilburne.
Not surprisingly, the attitude of the Presbyterians changed little. A distinct
group in parliament ensured that Lilburne faced renewed diﬃculties almost
immediately after his release in October 1645.O n10 November, Lilburne
presented a petition regarding the discharge of his Star Chamber ®ne, which
had been hanging over him since 1637.'# Rather than help him, however, the
Commons referred Lilburne's aﬀairs to the committee of accounts, which was
emergingasapowerfultoolofthePresbyterianfaction,underthechairmanship
of Lilburne's enemy, William Prynne.'$ Lilburne clearly saw this as another
attempt to harass him, particularly since the committee was ordered to take
evidence from another enemy, Colonel King.'% Lilburne's friends, however,
stepped in to protect him from Prynne once again, and on 13 February 1646,
theLordsheardthecaseofhisStarChamber®nebythecounselthathehimself
had requested, John Bradshaw and John Cook.'& The Lords rati®ed the
Commonsdecisiontodischargethe®ne,andtheprocessofgrantingreparations
wassupportedbythetwomostpowerfulIndependentgrandees,ViscountSaye
'" Ball, Tractatus, sig. A2, pp. 2±5, 7, 9±10, 12±13, 15. '# CJ, iv,p .338.
'$ CJ, iv,p .338; Peacey, `Politics, accounts and propaganda'.
'% CJ, iv,p .338; Lilburne, Innocency and truth, pp. 64±5, 68±72.
'& Lilburne,Justmansjusti®cation(2ndedn),p.26;LJ,viii,pp.127,164±5;HLRO,MP2}2}46;
A Diary, or an Exact Journall, 4 (12±18 Feb. 1646), p. 2; A true relation of the materiall passages of Lieut.
Col. John Lilburnes suﬀerings (1646); T. Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland (Oxford, 1975), pp. 262±76;
J. S. A. Adamson, `The English nobility and the projected settlement of 1647', Historical Journal,
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and Lord Wharton.'' Such political action in defence of Lilburne coincided
with further favourable comments regarding him in the press, particularly in
Mercurius Britanicus, which was written by Lilburne's old friend Marchamont
Nedham, and which had become a powerful mouthpiece for the
Independents.'( Lilburne's success in avoiding action by the committee of
accounts, and in garnering support in parliament and the press, re¯ected the
down-turn in the fortunes of the Presbyterian faction. Correspondingly, the
revivaloftheearlofEssexandthehighPresbyteriansasapoliticalforce,during
the later spring and early summer of 1646, posed new problems for Lilburne,
particularly when Nedham was silenced.') As a result of such changes, the
Presbyterians were able to ensure that Lilburne's press was tracked down and
seized,'* and by April 1646, Lilburne faced charges of having slandered his old
foe Colonel King, and was returned to prison. Lilburne again blamed Prynne
for instigating the moves against him.(!
It has been claimed that `Lilburne looked in vain to Cromwell and the
radicalsforsupport'inthespringof1646,thathewas`completelydisillusioned
with the parliamentary radicals', and that his opposition by this stage was
`implacable'.(" Lilburne certainly claimed later that he had been `left in the
suds by L[ord] G[eneral] Cromwell'.(# Nevertheless, Lilburne's subsequent
resentment against his old friends in parliament should not cloud our
judgements, and once again the facts do not support the thesis that Lilburne
was without friends in 1646. In fact, Lilburne was released fairly rapidly, and
was involved, in late May 1646, in the distribution of a pamphlet at
Westminster called A word in season.($ This work was an attack upon
Presbyterian propaganda from the City, and the petition then being circulated
which called for negotiations with the king.(% The London petition was an
ominous sign of the balance of power in the capital, and the Independents
clearly wanted to counter its in¯uence. It seems likely that Lilburne was
enlisted to support the Independents, alongside other trusted allies of the
factionatWestminster. Thisparticularpamphlet,whichwaslicensed byone of
the Independents' close friends, John Bachelor, was probably a collaborative
'' CJ, iv,p .338; A true relation of the materiall passages,p .11; LJ, viii, pp. 194, 217, 272; Perfect
Passages of Each Dayes Proceedings, 71 (25 Feb.±4 Mar. 1646), pp. 564±5; The Weekly Account, 9
(18±24 Feb. 1646), sigs. I3v±I4; Perfect Occurrences, 71 (13 Mar. 1646), sig. L.
'( Mercurius Britanicus, 116 (26 Jan.±2 Feb. 1646), p. 1021; J. S. A. Adamson, `The peerage in
politics, 1645±1649' (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1986), p. 159; Peacey, `Henry Parker', pp. 154±9;
Mercurius Britanicus, 121 (9±16 Mar. 1646), p. 1058; Mercurius Britanicus, 127 (20±7 Apr. 1646),
pp. 1088±9, 1094.
') Peacey, `Henry Parker', pp. 158±9; Adamson, `Peerage in politics', pp. 130±68.
'* The petition and information of Joseph Hunscott (1645);A true relation of all the passages ¼ against
William Larnar (1646); Plomer, `Secret printing', pp. 389±403.
(! Lilburne, Resolved mans resolution,p .39; Lilburne, Grand plea,p .3.
(" MacCormack, Revolutionary politics, pp. 91, 129.
(# Lilburne, Just man's justi®cation (2nd edn), p. 26.
($ J. Sadler, A word in season (1646, BL, E1184}3).
(% M. Mahony, `Presbyterianism in the City of London, 1645±1647', Historical Journal, 22
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eﬀort by two well-known pamphleteers, John Sadler and William Walwyn.(&
It is possible that Lilburne was on friendly terms with both men, since Walwyn
wasanotherfutureLeveller,whileSadlerwas,likeLilburne,aformercolleague
of Lord Brooke. The possibility that this pamphlet received tacit support from
the Independent grandees is enhanced by the fact that Sadler was a special
secretary to parliament, having been employed in 1645 to publish the king's
`Naseby letters'.('
Although the Independents protected Lilburne in the spring of 1646, his
workagainstthePresbyterians,andhisrenewedattackuponColonelKingand
the earl of Manchester, ensured that his tribulations continued. On 10 June
1646 a new warrant was issued for Lilburne's arrest, probably on Manchester's
orders.(( Once more, it has been claimed that Lilburne was committed to
prison`withnoperceptibleprotestfromhisoldfriends',butagainthe evidence
is more ambiguous.() On his way to appear before the Lords (11 June),
Lilburne `took sanctuary at a friend's lodging' in order to compile a
protestation to deliver to parliament. Having drafted his piece, Lilburne then
visited the Independent grandee,Lord Wharton, to show him the work, and to
enjoin him to use it to lobby the peers.(* Wharton was, as contemporaries
recognized, Lilburne's greatest ally in the Lords, and must have been expected
to oﬀer assistance.)! Nevertheless, Lilburne's eﬀorts to rally the Independent
aristocracy appear to have proved fruitless. He received little by way of
constructive help in parliament, and was committed to Newgate following the
hearing.)"
The ambiguity of the evidence surrounding these events centres on the
problems of interpreting the lack of `perceptible protest' from Lilburne's allies.
It is less certain that Lilburne's friends had abandoned him than that his
enemies were in a position of great strength in the Lords. The Presbyterians
certainly appear to have been masterminding a campaign against Lilburne in
the upper House. At the hearing, three Presbyterian earls (Manchester,
Stamford, and Lincoln) spoke against him, and the committee nominated to
investigate his case was predominantly Presbyterian as well.)# It was probably
the power of Manchester and the Presbyterian peers, therefore, which resulted
(& [J. Sadler], A word in season (1646, BL, E337}25); A transcript of the registers of the worshipful
company of stationers (3 vols., London, 1913±14), i,p .230; The writings of William Walwyn,
pp. 196±204; Peacey, `Henry Parker', pp. 32, 241±2.
(' DNB; A. Woolrych, From Commonwealth to Protectorate (Oxford, 1982), pp. 203±9; Peacey,
`Led by the hand', pp. 36±7; Lilburne, Jonah's cry,p .5; J. Lilburne, The upright man's vindication
(1653), p. 29.
(( Lilburne, Grand plea,p .4; J. Lilburne, The free-mans freedom vindicated (1646), p. 3; Lilburne,
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)! Mercurius Aulicus, 6 (2±9 Mar. 1648), sig. F2v.
)" Lilburne, Freemans freedom vindicated, pp. 4, 7; LJ, viii,p .370; J. Lilburne, An anatomy of the
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in Lilburne's being committed close prisoner (23 June), pending the com-
position of new charges.)$ When the charge was read before the Lords on
10 July ± accusing him over his comments regarding Manchester, Stamford,
and Colonel King ± Lilburne refused to respond, and was proceeded against
proconfesso.HewassenttotheTower,andhisbookswereorderedtobeburnt.)%
Nevertheless,anumberofpamphletsappearedinLilburne'sdefence,)&andthe
peers were forced to appoint a committee to investigate complaints regarding
one piece, called An alarum to the House of Lords. Although it included
Northumberland and Wharton, this committee was essentially Presbyterian in
character, and was dominated by Essex, Manchester, Lincoln, and
Willoughby.)' In an eﬀort to undermine Lilburne yet further, this committee
employed a stationer called Robert Eeles, who evidently showed some zeal in
hunting for Lilburne's presses and pamphlets.)( Furthermore, Richard
Overton claimed to have been harangued by two of the leading Presbyterian
peers (Essex and Hunsdon) at the committee hearing after his arrest.)) The
order, on 17 September 1646, to ®ne Lilburne £2,000, and the sentence of
seven years in the Tower, was a clear signal of the Independents' failure to
protect Lilburne from the Presbyterians in the Lords.)* Nevertheless, the
reasons for this failure are not entirely clear. It is clear that the Independents
would have been unable to protect Lilburne in the upper House, since
the Presbyterians increasingly held sway.*! It is possible, however, that the
Independent peers were largely unwilling to defend their former ally, and
theonlyevidenceofassistancewastheappointmentofGabrielBeckeascounsel
to assist in his defence.*" It is possible that the Independents, or at least the
`Royal Independents', had lost patience with Lilburne.
TheattitudeoftheIndependentsmayhavebeenconditionedbytheattitude
of Lilburne, and if the views of the former are unclear, then the reaction of the
latter is plain. It is at this moment, in June 1646, that a split between Lilburne
and some elements of the Independent alliance occurred, and that he began to
wield the theoretical weapon forged from parliamentarian theory. Lilburne
had warned in 1645 that parliament could be held accountable if it betrayed
the trust of the people, and his judgement regarding the legitimacy of
parliamentwasclearlyepitomized,ifperhapsnotdetermined,bythetreatment
hehimself received.By the summer of1646,Lilburnefelt betrayed,*# and while
)$ LJ, viii,p .388; J. Lilburne, The just man in bonds (1646), pp. 3±4; Lilburne, Anatomy,p .5;
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it would be wrong to say that his radical theory was formed by his treatment,*$
personal experience clearly in¯uenced the timing of its application. This is
certainly suggested by an analysis of the nature of Lilburne's split with the
Independents,sinceheinitiallyturnedontheLordsratherthanthe Commons.
Although Lilburne had developed a theory of popular rather than merely
parliamentary sovereignty, he was not yet using his ideas to their full potential.
Instead, he limited himself to an attack upon the House of Lords by asserting
the superiority of the House of Commons. Lilburne began to attack his old
friends in the upper House in a work published in late June 1646, in which he
dismissed their order commanding his appearance. As a free man of England,
Lilburne protested that he was `not to be used as a slave or vassal by the
Lords'.*% The events of the summer of 1646, and the treatment of Lilburne,
coincidewiththeemergenceoftheLevellersasadistinctgroup,asexpressedby
the Remonstrance of many thousand citizens, published on 7 July by Richard
OvertonandWilliamWalwyn.Nevertheless,theytooexpressedhostilitytothe
Houseof Lords,by means ofan appeal to the Commons,*& and Overton's other
pamphlets make it explicit that the target was `arbitrary usurpations or
encroachments' of the House of Lords `upon the sovereignty of the supreme
House of Commons'.*'
Lilburne criticized the peers as an estate, and it seems that he had split with
the more moderate Independents, whose grandees were powerful in the upper
House. He had not yet split with all of the Independents, and in spite of his
attack on the Lords, the campaign to defend him was not abandoned. Rather,
it took a diﬀerent form; becoming centred on the Commons, where he could
expect more favourable treatment. This was not simply because the
Independents were more powerful in the lower House, nor simply because
republicans such as Henry Marten were active political ®gures. Lilburne's
expectations were reasonable because of the working alliance which survived
betweenMartenandthe`RoyalIndependents',andwhileLilburneappearsto
have split from the latter in the summer of 1646, Marten's continued support
provided hope. Lilburne's reliance upon Henry Marten was apparent from the
moment of his imprisonment in the summer of 1646. Upon his petition from
Newgate (16 June), the Commons referred his case to a committee chaired by
Marten, and Lilburne certainly claimed to have been `not a little refreshed' by
this move, `thinking that you [Marten], of all the men in the House of
Commons,wouldhavebeenthemostsensibleofmycondition'.*(Nevertheless,
the breaking of one link in the chain which joined the members of the
Independent alliance produced unbearable tensions, and it became in-
creasingly clear that a situation in which Lilburne was protected by Marten
*$ Tolmie, Triumph of the saints,p .49.
*% J. Lilburne, A copy of a letter sent by Lieu. Col. John Lilburne to Mr Wollaston (1646); Lilburne,
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could not co-exist with a meaningful relationship between Marten and the
`RoyalIndependents '.Thestoryoftheensuingmonthswasoneinwhichthese
tensions became apparent, causing Lilburne to grow disillusioned with the
Commons as well as with the peers.
Lilburne became reliant not just upon Marten, but upon Marten's ability to
rally others in the Commons and the press, where the Independents had begun
to circumvent the predominantly Presbyterian licensing system.*) That this
was the case is suggested by the support which was forthcoming from the most
important pro-Lilburne pamphleteer, William Ball. Since publishing his last
pamphlet, Ball had taken a seat in the Commons, almost certainly on the basis
of Marten's support,** and his sympathy for Lilburne is clear from a letter
which he wrote to William Lenthall expressing contempt for the tyranny of
parliamentary authority."!! In June 1646, Ball developed his views in a
pamphlet which he subtitled `the rule of the freeborn people', and which
strongly echoed Lilburne's views. Ball emphasized the `intensive power' of the
people, claiming that Englishmen had never assented to any form of arbitrary
power, least of all the unlimited power of parliament. He stressed that the
people could reassert their primitive intensive power when their fundamental
liberties and properties were violated, and said that it was `destructive to the
very essence of their freedom not to be able to determine themselves to that
which they conceive to be bonum commune'. Parliament, on this account, was
regarded as the highest court, but could not go beyond its trust, while the
people remained the highest power; the eﬃcient and ®nal cause of political
authority."!" Ball's work represented a shot across the bows of parliament, and
a warning that if the authorities at Westminster proved tyrannous then the
people might legitimately reclaim their primitive powers. Ball, like Lilburne,
was not yet claiming that such a stage had been reached, but he was oﬀering
a timely warning that the treatment of men such as Lilburne could change this
situation.
Pamphlets like Ball's provided the most constructive assistance to Lilburne's
cause, if not to the man himself. In the Commons, meanwhile, Lilburne's
dwindling group of friends persevered with their attempts to help him, and the
committee chaired by Marten continued to sit into late 1646. In mid-October
1646, it was to Marten that Richard Overton directed his appeal from
Newgate, which was published in pamphlet form,"!# and in early November
Lilburne attended a committee hearing chaired by Marten, to whom he
subsequently presented a written copy of his speech, as well as a detailed
account of his conduct before the Lords. Marten may have realized that he
could eﬀect little in parliament, and even that the appointment of his
*) Peacey, `Henry Parker', pp. 241±5. ** CJ, iv, pp. 438, 445.
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committee had been aimed at sweeping Lilburne's case under the carpet.
Marten may, therefore, have arranged for Lilburne's deposition to appear in
pamphlet form, as An anatomy of the lords tyranny."!$ He may also have connived
in the appearance of another work defending Lilburne, called Vox plebis
(19 November), which recounted his troubles over Colonel King and the earl
of Manchester. This was probably the work of Marchamont Nedham,
Lilburne's old ally, and another of Marten's friends."!%
Inspiteofsuchpamphletsupport,Lilburne,havinggrowndisillusionedwith
the `Royal Independents' and the House of Lords, began to despair of his
supposed friends in the Commons towards the end of the year, as he languished
inprison.Lilburnefacedaparliamentwhichwasforthemostparthostile,even
in the Commons, and probably realized that his friends were unable to oﬀer
assistance. As a result, he came to regard the entire parliament as tyrannous,
and thus susceptible to the theory which he had developed in 1645. In early
1647, the tyranny of parliament was probably epitomized for Lilburne in his
harassment by Prynne and the committee of accounts. Lilburne railed against
Prynne, who he felt sought to `blast my reputation and credit, and so by
consequencedestroy me and mine'. Lilburne claimed that Prynne did so in the
knowledgethathewas`fastbythehealsunderagreatindignationoftheHouse
of Lords', and that `my business by way of appeal was depending in the House
of Commons, and ready for a report'. Prynne's tactic, according to Lilburne,
was to make `a most false groundless and lying report' from the committee of
accounts, `that I was in their debt above £2,000'. Since this accusation was
based upon evidence provided by Colonel King, Lilburne regarded the
decision as biased and unreliable."!& When Lilburne sought to respond in early
January 1647, however, his house was searched, his pamphlets were im-
mediatelyordered to be seized and burnt, and he wasquestioned once more."!'
It was as a result of his sense of disillusionment and betrayal, and his
detection of a new tyranny, that Lilburne grew closer to disgruntled royalists,
with whom he began to consort in the Tower of London. The ®rst indication
of this new alliance appeared in a pamphlet published in November 1646,i n
which Lilburne responded to criticisms by John White, a warder in the Tower.
Lilburne regarded White as a ¯unky ± one of the `old mastive dogs' who had
been set upon him by the Lords ± and when he forced White to issue a
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retraction, he was assisted by royalists such as Sir John Strangeways and Sir
Lewis Dyve."!( Such contacts were not simply the `horse-play' suggested by
Lilburne's biographers, but re¯ected a shared hostility to the jurisdiction
claimed by Westminster, and doubtless accelerated the rate at which Lilburne
alienated former friends amongst the Independents."!) Furthermore, as
Lilburne began to attack parliament with a new vehemence, the arguments
which he developed bore a remarkable similarity to those of the proli®c
pamphleteer David Jenkins, one of the royalist prisoners in the Tower. As a
resultofhiseﬀorts,JenkinsfacedaunitedfrontprovidedbybothLilburne'sold
enemies, such as Prynne, as well as former friends amongst the Independents,
such as Oliver St John, John Bradshaw, and Gabriel Becke,"!* not to mention
old allies from the press, such as William Ball""! and Henry Parker.""" The
prosecution of Jenkins provided a hint of the coalition which would soon
conspire against Lilburne himself, particularly since, in June 1647, the Lords
had concluded that Lilburne and Jenkins were the chief fomenters of the
distempers in the army and the city.""#
Not surprisingly, Lilburne was attacking both the Lords and the Commons
by this stage. He not only perceived what recent historians have recognized,
namely the existence of a bi-cameral Independent faction,""$ but suspected
that his former friends in the Commons were subservient to the interests of the
peers. In June 1646, the author of A pearle in a dounghill had referred to the
Commons as `creatures' of the Lords, and in July 1647, Lilburne claimed that
`King Cromwell and Prince Ireton' were the `principal instrument that keep
me in prison, because I will not comply with their turncoat lordly interest'.""%
LilburnealsosuggestedthatCromwellpleaded`downrightfortheLords',and
derided his `hocus pocus dealing'.""& In September 1647, when Lilburne
repeatedhisclaimsregardingCromwell's`lordlyinterest',headdedthat,`little
good may I or the kingdom expect from his counsell or actions, who is now so
closely glued in the interest and counsell to those four sons of Machiavelli, who
never heartily loved the liberties of the commons of England in their lives, viz.
the lord Say, the lord Wharton, young Sir Henry Vane, and solicitor St
John'.""' Lilburne provides, therefore, evidence for those who detect the
predominance of the `lordly interest' in English politics at this time, even if it
isimportanttorecognizethat,imbuedwithasenseofthepeers'betrayalofhim
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""! CJ, v,p .167; W. Ball, The power of kings discussed (1649).
""" Peacey, `Henry Parker', pp. 122±3, 289. ""# LJ, ix,p .244.
""$ J. S. A. Adamson, `Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament', in J. S. Morrill, ed., Oliver
Cromwell and the English Revolution (London, 1990), pp. 49±92; Adamson, `English nobility',
pp. 567±602. ""% Pearle in a dounghill,p .4; Lilburne, Juglers discovered,p .4.
""& J. Lilburne, The additional plea (1647), pp. 17±23; R. Overton, An appeale from the degenerate
representative body (1647).
""' J. Lilburne, Two letters writ by Lieut. Col. John Lilburne (1647), pp. 4±5.642 j. t. peacey
and his cause, he used the term `lordly interest' as an insult, and one which he
waswillingtoemployinalibellousandindiscriminatemanner.Mostcrucially,
however, Lilburnebeganto despairofhissupporters in parliament.Indeed, by
June 1647, he had even begun to doubt the ®delity of his closest ally, Henry
Marten, and criticized his `dilatory and unjust delaying'.""( Lilburne alleged
that even the radical element of the Independent alliance had betrayed the
cause and sold out to the grandees. He claimed that Marten had `exasperated
the spirits of the House of Lords against me and exposed me to their merciless
fury and devouring indignation'."") Lilburne's partnership with the
Independents of all hues appeared to have come to an end, and perhaps it is at
this point that the Levellers truly emerged as a force hostile to parliament.""*
III
By the middle of 1647, Lilburne was as keen to in®ltrate the army as to work
with the royalists, and as the leader of the Levellers his radicalism precluded
him from receiving the support of all but a small minority of his former friends.
Lilburnenotonlyceasedtobeuseful,butbecameaseriousthreat.Nevertheless,
the collapse of the Presbyterian `counter-revolution', and the army's march on
LondoninAugust1647,wasfollowedbyanothertwistinLilburne'sstory,since
there appears to have been an attempted rapprochement between himself and
the Independent grandees. This probably re¯ected a last ditch eﬀort to buy
Lilburne back from opposition, where he could be very dangerous. A meeting
betweenLilburneandOliverCromwellwasheldintheToweron5 September,
butitsoonbecameclearthatrelationswerebeyondrepair,andthemeetingdid
not go well. Cromwell reportedly asked Lilburne `how it came to pass that he
had fallen out with his best friends, and was become so great an enemy to the
parliament'.Lilburneapparentlyrepliedthat`he neitherhad, noreverwould,
fall out with his friends, but he saw with much grief of heart that those who he
esteemed his friends had fallen oﬀ both from him and their ®rst principles'."#!
The reason for the failure to heal the rift between Lilburne and the grandees
wasthefracturingoftheIndependentalliance,duringwhichMartenmade the
decisive split with the `Royal Independents'. Thereafter, the Independent
grandees no longer needed to humour Marten's support of Lilburne."#" This
split also served to bring the latter two ± natural allies ± closer together, and
Marten appears to have convinced Lilburne that he was not a turncoat, and
that he had genuinely been seeking to provide help. Marten asserted that he
had tried on numerous occasions to deliver his report to the Commons
""( J. Lilburne, A copy of a letter written to Collonell Henry Marten (1647).
"") Lilburne, Rash oaths unwarrantable, pp. 2±3, 4±5.
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concerning Lilburne's case,"## and was probably responsible for securing
Lilburne's arrears of army pay."#$ As a result, Lilburne claimed to have been
given `full satisfaction' for what he regarded as Marten's `former neg-
ligence'."#%
The prospects ofgainingsatisfaction from the grandees, however, were poor.
The absence of enthusiasm for a policy of de!tente with Lilburne on their part
is clear from the resistance which Marten and his committee continued to
encounter in the early autumn. In mid-September 1647 the committee
recommended that Lilburne be awarded reparations,"#& but a move that he
should be released was quashed by the Lords."#' Meanwhile, parliament
sought to place new controls on the press, and to reform the London militia, on
which such legislation was based."#( This process, which was aimed at the likes
of Lilburne, was masterminded by those Independents whom Lilburne had
formerly regarded as his allies. Most interesting is the involvement of William
Ball, who remained with the remnants of the Independent alliance after the
departure of Henry Marten. Ball guided the press ordinance through the
Houses, and was given the responsibility for organizing some of the new
system's®rstvictims."#)HostilitytoLilburnewithinWestminsterwasdoubtless
exacerbated by the way in which, in his deposition to the Commons in the ®rst
week of October, he again denied the jurisdiction of the Lords over a
commoner like himself."#* Through Marten's persistence, the Commons did
eventually agree to consider the committee's report (15 October), but when
Lilburne appeared, he delivered his case with `expressions very high'
(20October). Lilburne's subsequent release in early November alarmed
sections of parliament, particularly in the Lords, who complained at not
having been informed of the decision to set him free."$!
ThedistrustofLilburneamongthe`RoyalIndependents'wassoonjusti®ed,
as he quickly redoubled his eﬀorts against parliament. Within a matter of days
of his release, the Agreement of the people was vexing the Lords (who ordered a
declaration in response), and Lilburne began developing a well-organized
networkoffriendsandagentstomobilizesupportandorganize propaganda."$"
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Such tactics simply provoked further delays in the consideration of Lilburne's
business,"$# and when the Presbyterian minister, George Masterson, provided
eye-witness evidence regarding Lilburne's meetings, and the extent to which
his friends were organized (18 January 1648), the response was swift and
severe. After Lilburne had delivered a `tedious answer', his bail was
withdrawn, and he was returned to the Tower. What is interesting about the
action taken in early 1648 is that it was masterminded for the ®rst time by
Independents rather than Presbyterians. Lilburne was no longer of any use to
those who had previously sought to protect him, and had become a powerful
enemy, against whom resources had to be marshalled. The secretary of the
Derby House committee, Walter Frost, was delegated to issue a refutation of
the Levellers' position, and Masterson's account was quickly published."$$
These works were intended to coincide with a trial, the Commons having
appointedsomeofLilburne'soldallies ± includingJohnBradshawandGabriel
Becke ± to head the prosecution in King's Bench,"$% while Henry Parker, from
whom Lilburne had learnt so much, sought to distance himself from his
putativepupil."$&TheeventsofJanuary1648represent,therefore,the®nalnail
in the coﬃn of a relationship between Lilburne and the `Royal Independents'
which had been damaged irreparably in 1646. Lilburne now attacked the
political grandees with renewed venom, and began to rewrite his own history
to deny that they had ever been his friends."$' Lilburne, along with other
contemporaries, clearly regarded Cromwell as being allied with this group of
aristocratic grandees. The royalist author of Mercurius Pragmaticus styled
Cromwell and Saye `the two fathers of the faction',"$( and in May 1648
Lilburne attacked `Oliver Cromwell and other his Spaniolised creatures',
claiming to have detected an alliance between parliament and the army
grandees. Cromwell was now styled `that usurper tyrant, thief, and murderer',
and Lilburne highlighted the way in which Cromwell had joined forces with
Manchester, the man he and Lilburne had originally tried to impeach."$)
IV
It is at this point, in the spring of 1648, that it is possible to say that Lilburne
had become the pariah who is familiar to conventional accounts. Lilburne's
subsequent story was one of a desperate struggle for assistance from a disparate
and increasingly powerless group of men. Although he was not without success
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in garnering favour from both royalists and republicans, little was achieved by
way of constructive help. While Lilburne'slater years repay scrutiny, this piece
will hopefully have contributed to our understanding of his career by placing
him within the context of English politics in the 1640s, and by reassessing the
extent to which he was `ungovernable', and in perpetual con¯ict with the
governments under which he lived. This reading suggests that Lilburne's
increasingly radical political theory, while real, was less signi®cant for
explaining his career during the ®rst Civil War than his involvement in the
arcane and Byzantine proceedings at Westminster. By stripping away the
layers of propaganda with which Lilburne covered his own story, and by
discountingaretrospectiveanalysis,itispossibletoshowtheextenttowhichhe
had worked with the political Independents, and the extent to which they had
sought to protect him. During the mid-1640s the Independents had certainly
exploited Lilburne, but he also formed part of their alliance, which was able to
encompass men with diﬀering, and more or less radical, views. The story of
Lilburne's split from the Independents is not one which centres on him
becomingmore`radical',orindeedonhisalliesbecomingmore`conservative'.
Rather, it is a scenario in which `radical' and `conservative' members of the
Independent alliance drifted apart. It was only during the second half of 1646
that Lilburne broke with some of the more `conservative' members of this
group, in an indication of the progressive fracturing of the alliance which
wouldtakeplaceoverthefollowingtwoyears.Lilburneprobablyturnedonthe
Lords in part because he felt personally betrayed, and it was his dismissal of
their authority which caused the rift with his former allies. By accusing the
peers of tyranny, and by challenging their jurisdiction, Lilburne not only
alienated his aristocratic friends, but their allies in the Commons. It was
Lilburne's breach with the Lords, rather than the Leveller opposition to
`parliament', which proved fatal. By refocusing his story in this way, it is
possiblenotjusttocontributetoourunderstandingofLilburne,buttoenhance
the picture of parliamentary politics in the 1640s, in all of its complexity, and
with all of its shifting alliances and machinations in both Houses.